ABSTRACT AIMS -In the recent neuroscientific research addiction has been defined as a brain disease in which the addict's brain is "hijacked". The research indicates how the addictive cravings function in the brain's reward system. At the same time growing support has emerged to a view of addiction as a matter of choice. This viewpoint claims that those with addiction lack either willpower or the moral capacity to make the right decisions. In this article, we problematise these two models and argue that neither of them succeeds in providing successful and adequate means of tackling personal problems associated with agency and responsibility in relation to addiction. METHODSThe article uses means of social ethics and empirically informed analytical philosophy. RESULTS -After showing that the two prominent models are not sufficient in capturing the problematique of addictive behaviour, we propose a new approach called the affective choice model. CONCLUSIONS -As the disease model and the choice model fall short, we illustrate why the affective choice model is more capable of capturing the problematique of addicts' agency than the existing models are.
Introduction
Depending on the field, the phenomenon of addiction has been the focus of interest from intrapersonal and social perspectives. Neurosciences are increasingly focused on finding the neural mechanisms characteristic of addiction, while social sciences look for the social mechanisms and factors constituting and behind the addicts' problems. On the spectrum between these two modes of explanation, one can find a myriad of models on addiction (see West, 2006) . This article identifies two prominent views that present addiction in fundamental opposition to each other.
These views as such are not committed to any specific field of study in particular, but can both be promoted in various In conclusion, we argue that the two existing models of addiction fail to capture the problems associated with addicts' agency in an adequate manner, whereas our affective choice model succeeds in this task.
5
The debate between the disease and choice model of addiction
The medical concept of disease has been disputed mainly by those advancing the role of choice in addiction. 6 The difficulty in evaluating claims and viewpoints advanced by both parties is that many of those who participate in the discussion (therapists, researchers, policy makers) have either fiscal interests or a strong, often sible agency, whereas the choice model of addiction views addicts as agents making more or less rational choices.
1
The first part of the article introduces the disease view and the choice view of addiction in more detail. It places the debate between these theories into a societal context that involves the interests of those who advance certain viewpoints, both in the scientific study and in the treatment of addictive behaviours (Russell, Davies & Hunter, 2011) . We highlight the influence of professional interests and particular research agendas on theory formation by contrasting the extent to which addicts are seen as responsible for their addictive behaviour and/or recovery in the two models of addiction.
In the second part of the article a conceptual analysis illustrates how the disease view faces serious problems and that the choice model falls short of capturing the problems addicts face in their agency.
The analysis shows how addicts' agency and action is conceptualised in both of the models in terms of control (or its lack). 2 We argue that also in light of recent neuroscientific research on addictive crav- (Hyman & Malenka, 2001; Gutman, 2006; Kincaid & Sullivan, 2010 ).
The disease model treats addiction as a brain disease in which the addict's brain has been "hijacked". The research indicates how the addictive cravings function in the brain's rewards system. The proponents of the disease view argue that these changes in the brain cause the hijacking (Leshner, 2005; Hyman, 2007; Ross, Sharp, Vuchinich, & Spurrett, 2008) . They also suggest that addiction develops gradually and is a progressing illness, acquired through consumption of a particular substance depending on certain contingent matters including genetic factors, and is less a matter of personal choice. The disease model is often used in relation to the development of certain lifestyle-related somatic diseases. These include Type II diabetes, hypertension and asthma in which individual choice and the way of perceiving the disease is similar, both conceptually and phenomenologically (Sellman, 2009, p. 8) . More recently, neurobiological research that promotes the disease model has introduced the "brain hijacking" metaphor for addiction. It can, for instance, be argued that "drugs may capture control of brain mechanisms that control motivations and emotions" (Russell et al., 2011, p. 152) . In the same vein, it has been suggested that to a certain extent antecedent "neurophysiological forces" work in addicts' brains, affecting motivation, even before they enter situations involving either addictive substance or behaviour capable of producing gratification (Koob & Moal, 2008) .
In contrast to the disease model, the choice model of addiction starts from the assumption that all people make choices in their lives, including those that may lead to addictive behaviour (Heyman, 2009; Foddy & Savulescu, 2010; Ainslie, 2011) . There is no need to presuppose the existence of a somatic or psychosomatic disease in order to explain the nature of addictive behaviour, as the theoretical framework used to explain the nature and scope of choice suffices for the purpose.
In fact, according to this view, addiction is not much more than "a latent property of the rules of choice" (Heyman, 2010, p. 159 ). The choice model does not claim that the addicted person actively chooses to become an addict to begin with. Nevertheless, due to the consequent choices the person can be labelled "as if addicted".
A paradigmatic example is drug addiction that is understood as "repeated failures to refrain from drug use despite prior resolutions to do so" (Heather, 1998, p. 3) .
Although supporters of the choice model often exploit theories of economics, they do not deny the role of medical symptoms in the forms of addictive behaviours. In many cases the addicts have problems of medical nature, but this is not enough to conclude that biological factors lead to addiction: the logic of choice is capable of explaining it, as those with addiction lack either willpower or the moral capacity to make the right decisions or their rationality is deficient.
7 This reference to rationality usually implies defect in rationality that concerns the goals of the agent rather than merely instrumental, means-to-anend kind of, rationality. 
Basic remarks on addiction
The discussion has so far concerned the different models of addiction in theoretical and institutional contexts. However, in order to focus on the details of a particular model of addiction, we need a rough characterisation of the phenomenon we are in- We analyse the ability to make sound decisions by using the second notion of control introduced above, namely guidance control. This control is reason-responsiveness. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. There is empirical evidence that intense affect motivates addictive behaviour by modulating information processing and decision-making. Baker and others (2004) invoke a distinction between cold and hot modes of information processing, introduced by Metcalfe and Mischell (1999) At time 1 the agent has a choice between a small reward that will be available at time 2 and a larger reward that will be available at time 3. The curves I and II show how these future rewards are hyperbolically discounted to present value at earlier times. (Damasio, 1994) .
Strong affect thus impairs the decisionmaking of addicts in a manner that is consistent with choice models of addiction that portray addicts as maximisers of their short-term utility. However, Baker and others' affective processing model complements the choice model by describing an affective mechanism and an adjacent type of information processing that make it so difficult for addicts to break free from this frame.
Affective motivations of cognitive distortions
Emotions and feelings undermine an addict's decision-making more severely when they not merely reverse an agent's preferences but also contribute to the formation and maintenance of irrational be- and attributing all losses to "bad luck" is a detrimental emotion regulation strategy in the long run, as it results in an appearance that chance is always against the player (Tendler, 2011) . This appearance gives rise to feelings of moral indignation about unexpected or consecutive losses that also gnaw at the player's positive self-images of skill and competence, inducing feelings of shame and humiliation (Rosenthal, 1995) .
These negative emotions dispose players to tilting, characterised by deteriorated decision-making in gambling, loss of control over the activity, and chasing losses. Chasing is not directed merely at recouping monetary losses but also positive self-feelings by restoring a "fair balance" between wins and losses (Lesieur, 1984; Rosenthal, 1995; Rugle, 2004; Palomäki, Laakasuo, & Salmela, submitted) . Unfortunately, chasing in an emotionally upset state leads to further losses which aggravate feelings of anger, humiliation and self-blame and bring on other costs; financial and social (Browne, 1989; Ricketts & Macaskill, 2004) . Superstitious beliefs in the influ- 
Concluding remarks
This article has tried to provide a view on addiction in terms of socio-ethically contextualised and neuroscientifically in- 1 It may be argued that the contrast between these models is too sharp and, especially, that the concept of disease is implausible. Indeed, we agree that the concept of disease would benefit from a finer analysis. Nevertheless, we do not question here the plausibility of the dichotomy but take it simply as given. An unequivocal exemplar of the existing dichotomy can be found, for instance, in the first issue of 2012 of The Lancet where the Director of the US National Institute on Drug Abuse Nora Volkow is quoted as saying " [a] ddiction is a disease not a choice" (Jones, 2012, p. 20) .
2 As our anonymous reviewer points out, the concept of control is complex. We have, however, chosen the notion we are using by taking into account the context and thereby using the kind of notion that is in philosophical literature considered to be relevant in light of responsible agency, i.e. the factor on which the dichotomy rests. 3 The scope of the article does not allow us to deal with the notion of control in terms of self-governance, for instance. We concentrate on this notion that is determined by the difference between the two models. For recent discussion on the complexity of Brought to you by | Kansalliskirjasto Authenticated Download Date | 5/18/16 8:55 AM self-governance and the "true" self, see, for instance, Andreou (2012) . 4 We assume that behavioural addictions such as gambling are addictions even if we are aware that this assumption is controversial. Recent studies have, however, explored the common neurobiological basis for substance addictions and behavioural addictions with at least some success (see Kaasinen, Halme, & Alho, 2009 , p. 2075 Petry, 2006; Potenza 2006; Potenza 2009 ). 5 As our anonymous reviewer pointed out, different models serve different purposes and may thus differ from each other. We agree that the purpose of the model obviously affects its constitution and its use should be taken into account. Our purpose is to develop a general philosophical model of addicts' behaviour that succeeds in explaining addicts' actual behaviour and that can be further developed and explicated for various purposes of, for instance, therapeutic nature and policies. 6 The medical concept suggests lack of control required for responsibility. Of course this is not the only possible notion of the concept. However, we apply this notion because of its use in the dichotomy. For a more elaborated view on the disease concept see, for instance, Ries, Fiellin, Miller and Saitz (2009 Ainslie (2000) suggests that a model of addiction needs to account for addicts' changing their preferences. While the standard rational theory suffers from quite grave problems of accounting for unstable preferences, relapse or sudden shifts to heavy consumption, Ainslie's hyperbolic discounting faces problems too, as we explicate later in the paper (for more detailed criticism on rational choice theory, see Skog (1999, p. 192) . All in all, the choice model we characterise here rests on the point that these different choice models all assume that addicts choose and this choosing relies heavily on some kind of notion of rationality. Our criticism is that these models leave an important feature of addiction out. 8 There is an ongoing discussion whether it is useful to have an umbrella term such as addiction to cover all the varieties of the phenomena we ordinarily call addictions with their variety of intrinsic and extrinsic features and characteristics (see Foddy & Savulescu, 2006) . 9 Having addictive desires is obviously not sufficient for the phenomenon of addiction.
One needs other indicators such as genetic and social factors as well. 10 Of course, non-addicted people also have reward systems that regulate and control the behaviour relating to pleasure. 11 Drug and alcohol dependencies are associated with a cognitive processing bias: substance use is associated with enhanced attention to drug-related stimuli, which has been suggested to be related to craving. Dopamine seems to play an important role in this mechanism, and it has been suggested to be central to the core mechanism(s) of addiction. (Franken, Hendriks, Stam, & Van Den Brink, 2004; Robinson & Berridge, 2008 ; see also Lewis, 2011) . 12 There are obviously different ways of understanding what this control involves and how it works (cf. Lowe, 2008, pp. 195-196) . 13 The main problem with the hyperbolic discounting model is that it is incapable of explaining the behaviour of unwilling addicts who act against their preferences at the moment of acting. If such behaviour is empirically possible, then Donald Davidson (1980) is correct in claiming that at least some addictive behaviours involve weakness of the will. However, this question is not relevant to our affective choice model because strong emotions and feelings have been invoked in the explanation of the weakness of the will since Aristotle's seminal discussion of this phenomenon. 14 There may well be instances of intense withdrawal that literally incapacitate the agent, but these cases are hardly the paradigm case of addiction.
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